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Abstract: this paper discusses the issue of prac-
tical reasoning, considering it as a field of study 
shared among three areas: ethics, common sense 
and programming languages. It questions the 
exclusive connection of practical reasoning to the 
area of ethics, and seeks to show through analy-
sis of examples that other areas of common sense 
and programming languages also have important 
elements that characterize practical reasoning. 
We conclude that practical reasoning cannot be 
assumed solely from ethics, but it should open 
a research through the plurality of philosophical 
discussion.
Key words: argument, ethics, means-end, action, 
programming.
Resumen: en este trabajo se analiza la cuestión 
de la razón práctica, considerándola como un 
campo de estudio compartido entre tres zonas: 
ética, sentido común, lenguajes de programación. 
Cuestiona la conexión exclusiva del razonamiento 
práctico para el área de la ética, y trata de mostrar 
a través del análisis de ejemplos que otras áreas 
de sentido común y de los lenguajes de progra-
mación tienen elementos importantes en el razo-
namiento práctico. Llegamos a la conclusión de 
que el razonamiento práctico no se puede asumir 
exclusivamente de la ética, pero debe abrir una 
investigación a través de la pluralidad de la dis-
cusión filosófica. 
Palabras clave: argumento, ética, medios y fines, 
acción, programación.
The practical reasoning owns as main characteristic a thread of premises which conduct 
to a conclusion, this conclusion aims an action. This sort of reasoning is currently a fertile 
field of studies. We highlight some common elements such as: the separation between a 
group of premises and a conclusion, therefore a separation between precedent and conse-
quent, the importance of the relation between means and ends, and the determinations which 
rule the inferential procedures.
However, despite these so called common elements, the knowledge areas which use 
practical reasoning assume certain distance from each other. Such distance is easily noti-
ced in the effort that each area performs to delimit the components of their argumentative 
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processes. This delimitation process results not only in the enlightenment of argumentative 
components, but also in the enlightenment of a distinctive scope of a kind of reasoning as 
a whole face each of the involved areas, distinguishing each of them. What areas are these?
From the minimum classification that practical reasoning is an inferential process bet-
ween precedent and consequent, in which the conclusion demands an action, we are able to 
identify three knowledge areas: the common sense area, the ethics area and the programming 
languages area. Each of them owns its specific practical reasoning. And, in these three areas, 
the common characteristics are maintained. That is, in these three areas there is an inferen-
tial process, which is a passage from the premises to a conclusion, and the conclusion is 
a specific action. The deepening of this common characterization will show the details of 
similarities and differences between these three areas.
To perform this deepening we must first clarify the following characterization which 
connects them: 
(a) The common sense area will be characterized as the field of development of a 
means and ends relation, which has, as center of attention, a very restrict problem. Such 
restriction is conditioned by the scope where the problem is. This scope is the one where 
the agent holds full knowledge of all aspects at stake within this same field. Example: (1) I 
have to go out, but (2) it’s raining, (3) so I take an umbrella, or another example, related to 
an Aristotle tradition: “Every man must go for a walk; I am a man. Therefore I must go for 
a walk”1;
(b) In the area of ethics a background reflection determines the inferential movement 
of the argument (the passage of precedent to consequent), and results in a conclusion that 
aims an action. This constitutes an argumentative core which confers the designation of the 
reasoning as moral-practical reasoning. Ethics, more precisely, remains in the reflection that 
determines the action, or a change of state of mind or even of intention, of the agent. The 
central characteristic of the practical reasoning in ethics is that there is an inflection on the 
premises and, therefore, on the means and ends relation. This relation is dislocated from 
its component character in relation to practical reasoning. A possible example is the one 
originated from the thesis which defends that certain reasons are assembled to premises2. 
1 This is a reformulation made by D.J. Allan, of one of the forms of Aristotle’s practical syllogism. This example 
can be complex than the previous one, due to its possible connection to an action characterized as “moral” 
action: “The Practical Syllogism”. In: Mansion, S. Autour d’Aristotes. Louvain, 1955, p.336s. In addition, Allan 
also introduced a conception where there are two incompatible practical reasoning: one that orients itself by 
means and ends and other that orients itself by the appliance of a general rule. The general rule is explicit in the 
concept of prudence and, hence, enters into ethics universe. Allan’s work has suffered much criticism, including 
accusations from Gauthier and Jolyf in Gauthier, R. A.; Jolif, J. Y. L’Etique a Nicomaque (comentaire). Paris: 
J. Vrin, 1959, v2, p.209s, who disagree with the division between both types of practical reasoning due to their 
incompatibility. Furthermore, there is also the accusation made by Wiggins, who alleges that these practical 
reasoning found by Allan are, in fact, complementary, cf. Wiggins, D. “Deliberation an Practical Reasoning”. 
In: Millgram, E. (ed.) Varieties of Practical Reasoning. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001, p.286-290.
2 This is a debate about the rationality requirements and whether they are normative. For an analysis about the 
problems regarding the normativity of these rationality requirements, see the discussion between John Broome 
and Joseph Raz in Raz, J. “The Myth of Instrumental Rationality”, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy. 
April, v.1. 2005a, and in the Symposium of the same year: Broome, J. “Have We Reason to Do as Rationality 
Requires? A Comment on Raz”. In: Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy. Volume 1, Symposium I, issue 1, 
April, 2005, reply from Raz, in Raz, J. “Author’s Reply: Joseph Raz, ‘Instrumental Rationality: A Reprise’”. 
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Due to these reasons, the rational agent modifies his will and acts according to reason or a 
rational will. Thus, the ethical inflection lies on the wider consideration that the agent must 
act according to these reasons which are considered by the agent. In this case, the moral 
action follows a theory of rationality or practical reason. Yet, this direction can be objected, 
because, as the flank of practical reasoning is open to ethics, other ethical currents can pre-
sent themselves. This means: it is possible to add another direction to the moral-practical 
reasoning: the action can follow the emotion. A more detailed analysis about this ethical 
inflection, in both ethical currents: reasons or emotion, can be found in the inferential pro-
cess of practical reasoning, which will be analyzed ahead.
(c) In the area of programming languages, we have a diversified appropriation of 
resources developed by philosophy and by mathematics and even from other areas. There 
is a basic diversity in the Artificial Intelligence, which is expressed in different platforms3. 
Nevertheless, the priority now is to point out that in the Artificial Intelligence area we can 
also find the need to adopt some sorts of reasoning to solve practical problems, or in other 
words, sorts of reasoning which result in conclusions that lead to an action.
As a prior conclusion, we can assert that, all of these three areas develop practical rea-
soning from diverse foundations. These type of reasonings have similar characteristics, as 
they are classified as practical. Yet, the classification of their different foundations is not 
easy, because, inside the same area, there are distinct means of possible practical reasoning 
and, also, different means of conducting their argumentative processes. On this diversity, 
the foundations of each area can only be classified generically. Let’s proceed with this pre-
sentation according to each sort of practical reasoning separately.
In (a), the basis which supports the type of practical reasoning developed in the common 
sense area, refers to a group of cultural or social elements, or simply traditional elements 
from a community. These elements establish the parameters which intervened in the forma-
tion of premises and their thread. From this intervention, the basic structure of the practical 
reasoning directs the focus at the means and ends relation. The operational character of this 
reasoning aims the application to instant problems, specified within a known scope, which 
is, in the end, the community itself. The absence of the unknown is one of the main charac-
teristics of the common sense area, consequently, the foundation of these sorts of practical 
reasoning deals only with what is already known. 
In: Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, Volume.1, Symposium 1, issue 1. April, 2005b. Broome and Raz, 
agree that there is no “boostrapping”of reasons. Where, these reasons, would establish a “duty” of acting. The 
authors acknowledge Bratman’s contribution in Bratman, M. E. Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason. Cam-
bridge: Massachusetts University Press, 1987, p.23-27 and also p.42-43. According to Bratman, the agent is not 
able to make his/her intention become a reason that compels him/her to act.
3 These platforms are the constructions, in programming language, which support different systems. The systems, 
when they involve a community of artificial agents, are considered to be “multi-agents systems”. A detailing 
about multi-agents systems can be found in the bulky work of Russell, S.; Norvig, P. Artificial Intelligence: a 
modern approach. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2010, 3ª ed., p.34-59. Each system has a determined architecture. 
The classifications of these architectures can be found in Knapik, M.; Jonhson, J. Developing Intelligent Agents 
for Distributed Systems: Exploring, Architecture, Technologies, and Applications. MacGraw-Hill, 1998, p.151-
192. Finally, a common thematization between architectures and multi-agents systems is found in Wooldbridge, 
M.e Jennings, N. “Intelligent Agents: Theory and Practice”, Knowledge Engineering Review, January, 1995, 
v.10:2, p.130-139.
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Foundation of (b): the programming languages area is connected to processes and 
resources of a specific programmable language. There is a previous determination that pro-
vides meaning to the establishments of conventions which will be used. The basis, in this 
particular case, is built formally, and influences on the possible flexibility of the language, 
which will be used operationally to solve practical problems. Consequently, in a lower 
level4, the choice of a certain language influences on the aims which can be achieved by 
the same language, but the aims horizon remains open. This opening allows us to show an 
important difference between the programming languages and the common sense regarding 
the problem solving: the programming languages can operate with inedited problems that 
have unpredictable, unknown content, or a problem lacking information. The common sense 
only operates with one scope and one problem whose contents are known.
In (c): the area of ethics a determined reflexive-philosophical basis stands out. In this 
area, the actions of practical reasoning are identified as moral. We denominate the theo-
retical-philosophical basis as a “background reflection” or “ethical reflection”. The ethical 
reflection constitutes a speech with a set of philosophical concepts which justify why an 
action can be considered morally good or not. In the execution of the sorts of reasoning 
developed in an ethical reflection, the “determination” of the reflexive-philosophical basis 
adopted is present, and the practical reasoning can be entitled as “moral-practical reasoning”. 
Besides, the reflexive-philosophical basis of ethics represents an inflection about the general 
theme of practical reasoning. For the adoption of this reflection pre-conditions the relations 
between means and ends, and in this pre-conditioning, is possible to present an one-sided 
comprehension for every practical reasoning, considering it from its one-sidedness, just as 
a “moral-practical” reasoning. In the philosophical tradition, there is a custom of annulling 
the space for the common and the programming languages approaches regarding practical 
reasoning. Both areas perform reasoning using argumentative processes which conduct to 
an action, but, we cannot affirm that, under all circumstances, the practical reasoning is 
moral-practical reasoning. Therefore, the action, and the fact that a sort of reasoning has 
been developed, enlarges the possible classification of what is and what is not “practical 
reasoning”. And, in this sense, every time we find the word “practical reasoning” in a text, 
we should be cautious not to immediately classify it as been connected to the scope of 
moral action.
The justification to adopt diverse approaches of the moral-practical reasoning, that is, 
from areas other than ethics, is a product of the questioning on the strict connection bet-
ween practical reasoning and the ethics. The present article presents several subsidies for 
the untying of the practical reasoning and the ethics, keeping such connection, only in one 
of the cases. Such untying must have as positive effect, the enrichment of the philosophical 
debate on the practical reasoning, in general, and preparation of the discussion in a new field 
of knowledge: that of the programming languages.
To achieve this enriching untying we will proceed the following way: firstly, we will 
separate and regroup the areas; secondly, we will analyze the argumentative constitution of 
4 The expression “in a lower level” refers to a classification of computing languages: the low level languages are 
the ones closer to the machine language, whereas the “high level” languages are the ones that are built on low 
level languages which correspond to each other.
11The Ethics and the Practical Reasoning: About Common Sense and Programming
Daimon. Revista Internacional de Filosofía, nº 76 (Enero-Abril) 2019
the sorts of practical reasoning, underlining the relations between the premises and conclu-
sions; in third place, we will pursue the recovery of a wider sense of practical reasoning, 
allowing a new focus on the philosophical analysis, routing our conclusion.
The division and reunification of the three areas: ethics, common sense and programming 
languages will be in only two groups. The ethics must have a group itself, and the common 
sense will be clustered with the programming languages. The underlying thesis of this divi-
sion and reunification is that such configuration reflects the structure of internal reasoning 
of these areas. We will pursue the justification of this thesis through examples.
It should be noted that the general structure of reasoning consists of three propositions 
(or clauses) and an inferential process which shows the passage from the precedent to the 
consequent. This passage, which has different bases, modifies the way we treat propositions 
in the inferential passage itself. This modification reflects an influence on the content of pro-
positions, such influence is explained by its own bases, and distinguishes each area profile. 
The distinction of these profiles, notwithstanding, allows us to associate the common sense 
and the programming language areas without any significant losses of identity, besides, it 
allows us to separate the area of ethics. Ultimately, from this division and reunification we 
have two groups.
I. First group: the ethical reflection and the moral action
The first group includes the practical reasoning developed in the area of ethics. This 
practical reasoning holds, in its inferential process, at least one proposition that expresses the 
connection with a theoretical and philosophical base. In other words, this connection stands 
for the adoption of or commitment with an ethical reflection developed by a philosopher. 
Thus, from a structural point of view, it means that, at least one proposition, whether it is 
of the precedent or the consequent, allows a classification of the action from the practical 
reasoning as a moral action.
At that, the structure of the reasoning enables us to talk about its parts, based on what 
its propositions say. The conclusions of the practical reasoning in the area of ethics result in 
an action description, or in a mandatory action, or even in the expression of an intention to 
act5, in which all these actions are characterized as moral. All these different acts: “describe”, 
“have the obligation to…” and “intend” are liable to be simply classified: the description of 
an action is a report; the obligation of an action is the linguistic expression of this obligation; 
the intention to act is the linguistic expression of the mental state (or even, motivational 
state) of acting. The unity of these three different linguistic forms is the ethical reflection 
that is represented in the propositions content. Therefore, the passage from the precedent to 
5 Cf. Streumer: “I think, is that there are different kinds of practical reasoning: reasoning that concludes with a 
belief about reasons for action or about what we ought to do, reasoning that concludes with an intention, and 
reasoning that concludes with an action. These processes of reasoning often succeed each other and, if they do 
so immediately, they can be said to form one continuous process of practical reasoning. But these process may 
not always succeed each other immediately, and practical reasoning can also result in the non-performance of 
an action, in giving up an intention, or in giving up a belief about reasons for action or about what we ought to 
do.” Streumer, B. “Practical Reasoning”. In: O’Connor, T.; Sandis, C. (eds.) The Blackwell Companion to the 
Philosophy of Action. Oxford: The Blackwell Publishing, 2010, p.249.
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the consequent characterizes the practical reasoning, with such content and linguistic forms, 
as “moral-practical reasoning”.
To explicit, we will present this first example:
(1.a) Act as though your action were to be considered a universal maxim.
(1.b.) There is an elder facing hardship to cross a busy street, and I am able to help him 
[or: there is a clear situation where an ethical question is involved].
(1.c) I help the elder cross the street (description of an action), or 
(1.d) I must help this person cross the street, expression of an obligation or description 
of a mental state or intention. Or in (1.c) and (1.d) I have an action face the ethical question 
involved (1.b).
Both propositions, above (1.c) and (1.d), can be considered as different versions of 
the same conclusion. They are not opposite to each other, not even exclusionary, but only 
different. The further version (1.d) is used in order to behold the expression of a duty or 
description of the mental state of the agent who feels compelled to act, in this case, there 
isn’t an action itself, but the linguistic expression of the obligation. It means that the agent 
can have as a conclusion the expression of the duty to act or the expression of his intention 
to act, in this last case, the intention implies a change in his mental state6. At long last, we 
can formalize the argument (1) this way:
[p ^ (q ^ r)]  s
- where p = (1.a); q ^ r = (1.b, compound proposition) and s = (1.c or 1.d).
- and, in a natural language: “if my action must be in such a way to be considered a 
universal maxim, and there is an elder facing hardship to cross the street, who I can help, so 
I help him cross the street (describing an action), or I must help (expressing an obligation) 
or I want to help (expressing a mental status which reveals an intention)”.
The using of this formalization serves solely to clearly show the relations between 
the premises, where the precedent and the consequent differ, in addition to the inferential 
passage. The conjunction between the parentheses of “q” and “r” has to be true so that the 
precedent is also true. However, this formal exposition shows some important difference. 
Formally, we could have a false proposition and the conjunction between parentheses also 
false, and, nevertheless, the conclusion could be true. The relation of implication wouldn’t 
be false provided that one of the propositions of the precedent was false7. To put in another 
way, logically, the conclusion could be true even with a false precedent. This shows the 
difference between logical formalizations and the inferential process of the practical reaso-
ning, and it also shows the need (outside of the logic) that every precedent is actually true. 
In this relation between merely formal reasoning and practical reasoning, we can, in other 
formalization, probe such consequences. From the same content of propositions (1.a), (1.b), 
(1.c), and (1.d), let’s see the following relation between precedent and consequent:
(q ^ r)  (p  s)
6 Cf. Broome, J., 2009, p.76-84.
7 According to the rule of conjunction, if one of the propositions is false, every conjunction becomes false, and, 
thus, every precedent also becomes false. The implication wouldn’t be false, even if it was counterintuitive. 
This counterintuitive aspect is part of the consequences of the paradoxes of material implication.
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- where p = (1.a); q ^ r = (1.b compound proposition), s = (1.c or 1.d) and  means 
“therefore…”.
- where we read: if (1.b) there is an elder facing hardship to cross the street, and I am 
able to help him, therefore, if (1.a) my action must be considered a universal maxim, so, 
(1.c) I help him cross the street (description of an action), or (1.d) I must help (description 
of a mental state or intention).
In this last case, the determination found on proposition “p” (1.a), which is arising from 
an ethical reflection, was put on the consequent and cannot be false, under the condition that 
all conditional is false. The problem here is that the determination, of an ethical nature, does 
not play its role of supporting the conclusion, which occurs when it is part of the precedent 
as in the previous example. In the second example above, the ethical proposition is part of 
the conclusion.
It is important to notice that the paradoxical character of the material implication plays 
against the ethical influx in the conclusion. For the conclusion comprising two propositions 
under the operator of the material implication, allows the proposition “p”, of ethical nature, 
to be false, and even so, the conclusion, of the entire argument, will be true. For that reason, 
the importance of the proposition of ethical nature (“p” or (1.a)) influences on the reasoning 
itself and demands that the relation is only a conditional relation and not material implica-
tion. In the conditional relation “p  s”, “p” and “s” must be true. For “p” is true due to its 
ethical background, and “s” is true due to the practical character of the reasoning. Another 
way to analyze this conclusion would be by the use of a conjunction: “p ^ s”, where both 
propositions must be true so that the conclusion of the reasoning is also true. However, this 
would weaken “p” and also the ethical determination contained in the conditionality: “if…, 
then…”.
The logical resource highlights the importance of the ethical determination involved 
in the logical operations of a practical reasoning with ethical background. Whether in the 
first example or in the second, the ethical determination orients the comprehension of the 
conclusion and it is on the base of practical reasoning in the area of ethics.
Another way of approaching the sorts of practical reasoning in the field of ethics is to 
add reasons to the propositions. These reasons would depend on an ethical reflection, which 
would consist in a theory of the practical character of reason and, thus, this theory would 
lead the reasoning to a moral field. In the following example, the proposition which is in the 
conclusion (2.d or 2.c) illustrates this possibility. We can affirm that, once this conclusion 
is obtained, a very specific interpretation of rationality is at stake. This interpretation of 
rationality explains the action, or the obligation of an action, or the intention of an action. 
These possibilities are results of the connection between practical reasoning and a specific 
interpretation of human rationality, which also includes the influence of a philosophical 
perspective.
Let’s see these examples:
(2.a) There is an elder facing hardship to cross a busy street.
(2.b) I am able to help him.
(2.c) I help the elder cross the street (description of an action) or,
(2.d) I must help him cross the street (expression of an obligation).
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In this case, the formalization is this:
(p ^ q)  r
-where p = (2.a); q = (2.b) and r = (2.c) or (2.d).
-where we read: “if there’s an elder facing hardship to cross the street and I am able to 
help him, then I help him (I must help him)”.
In the example (2), the proposition (2.b) adds a reason so that (2.c) or (2.d) fulfilled. This 
added reason is not expressed in the reasoning, what is expressed is the specific proposition 
of the reasoning which refers to the support of the interpretation of rationality, which is 
arising from a specific ethical reflection. So, from this ethical reflection, there is an inflec-
tion point which forcibly operates on the reasoning by an external point. It is a divergent 
case from the previous one, when the ethical determination was expressed between one of 
the propositions, therefore, internally. In the example (2) above, the determination remains 
underlying and external. The conclusion expresses the action, which can be considered as 
moral and, this expression ends the reasoning.
According to these considerations, we are able to say that, elements which are not 
presented in the thread of premises support the conclusion (whether it is proposition 2.c or 
2.d). This underlying support accepts that, the fact that the agent has reasons, they are rea-
sons to act, so the agent must act. We can notice here that such reasons are more important 
than the presented facts in (2.c) and (2.d) themselves, imbued of importance, they remain 
underlying in the thread of premises (precedent and consequent). Furthermore, one of the 
facts: (2.c), “I am able to help him” adds a connection to an external reason, sustainer of an 
action classified as “moral”. It is possible to affirm that there is a rational normativity in the 
thread of the facts in the reasoning, but this normativity wouldn’t be a moral factor itself. 
To transform this normativity, which is inferential (and even merely formal), in a moral one, 
it is necessary to develop a theory of the action. It means we have to add something to the 
action. This something is more than the mere finding of a fact.
To affirm that both facts presented: “there is an elder facing hardship to cross a busy 
street” and “I am able to help him”, result in the conclusion: “I help him” or “I must help 
him”, will show a gap in the inferential process between the precedent and the consequent, 
such gap will only be solved by the interpretation of the agent’s rationality and the practical 
character of this rationality, that is, by a theory of the action which is implicit. The facts 
(2.a) and (2.b) need this implicit support to get to a conclusion (2.c or 2.d). The gap is filled 
by the comprehension of the roles that perform the reasons and the rationality of the agent 
on his practical behavior in face to such situation. It is a “reason imperative” that rules the 
will of every rational being8.
The practical reasoning is put in service of the external interpretation that transforms 
the proposition (2.b), which deals with the facts, in a reason to act. Therefore, the action 
becomes moral. The core of the external ethical determination is the assumption that this 
proposition (2.b) “I am able to help him” brings along the reason to such action, and the 
agent responds to it, acting.
8 Here, we have an ethical determination arising from a matrix of thinking, which is identified to Kant’s 
philosophy, and not an engagement to a humean theory, for it, we would need a premise that adds the following 
information: “I feel motivated to act due to a certain feeling”. 
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The argument (2) has the following situation: there is an (external) impediment, in which 
the proposition of the conclusion is false otherwise there would be a disagreement with 
the action or the practical rationality theory. On the other hand, if the precedent is false (a 
disguised actor playing the role of an elder facing hardship to cross a busy street), even so, 
the conditional would be true, because the conclusion is true (2.c or 2.d: “I help him” or “I 
must help him”). It illustrates the distance between logical resources in relation to inferential 
processes required for practical reasoning. On this matter, one of the theorists of the practical 
reasoning Douglas Walton, agrees with such distance: 
Practical reasoning is essentially pragmatic because it is not the formal validity of the 
argument structure that is at issue in evaluating a particular case. Instead, if the two 
premises of scheme are satisfied in a situation, a burden of proof is thrown on the 
critic who rejects the conclusion to pose an appropriate critical question. 9 (Walton, 
1992, p.999).
The burden of proof of a critical conclusion, in a practical reasoning, faces the pragmatic 
character revealed in the conclusion. In spite of this difference between logical and practical 
reasoning, the clear impossibility of an effective appliance of logical formalization10 makes 
the reasoning structure more visible on its susceptibility to the strength exerted by the ethical 
reflection. It is interesting that this external influence transforms the effectiveness of practi-
cal reasoning in a moral effectiveness. However, in its effectiveness an philosophical basis, 
the ethical reflection has its diversity and can refer to different matrices of philosophical 
thinking11.
Both arguments in examples 1 and 2, above, are examples of the use of practical rea-
soning applied in the moral field. The interface of these logical resources has opened the 
way to analyzing two sorts of ethical determinations: the internal one, in example 1, and 
the external one, in example 2. To say it in another way, despite the fact that in this two 
cases the practical reasoning might be considered as “moral-practical”, we can show that not 
every practical reasoning is “moral-practical”. The areas of common sense and programming 
languages also use practical reasoning, where there is no ethical determination, so there is 
no influence from an ethical base. The persistence in considering practical reasoning only as 
connected to ethics would represents a reductionism in the moral field which would deny, 
or even would usurp, the philosophical thematization of practical reasoning in other fields. 
In the next section, we will present these fields in your not-so usurped.
9 And also, p.998: “Practical reasoning fits the missing parts into the collection of means-end sequences that 
represents the agent’s knowledge of what is possible and plausible – in short, his plan of action.” Douglas 
Walton is an author with a wide work on Argumentation, Practical Reasoning and Artificial Intelligence.
10 We use only propositional logic in our examples. We don’t use symbolic logic or modal logic resources. 
Regarding this issue, inside modal logic, we must highlight the deontic logic from Von Wright. In this case, 
we underline his work on practical reasoning in Von Wright, H-G.. “On So-Called Practical Inference”. 1972, 
p.49s. However, the deontic logic approach demands a deepening beyond this article scope, for it would move 
away from the macro reach of the knowledge areas. The specification, through deontic logic, must be done in 
another work.
11 It is the case of the following ethical examples: a matrix with Kantian, neo-hobbesianism, humean or even 
aristotelic background.
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II. The second group: the instrumental practical reasoning
The practical reasoning mode, in the second group, covers two areas: the common sense 
and the programming languages. This union of both fields in only one group can be justified 
by a shared identity, but not fully. The justification for their sharing in only one group is 
in the relation of means and ends. And the difference between them is on the base which 
sustains this relation, as we will see below. The general classification of this shared mode 
of the relation means and ends can be expressed by the adjective “instrumental”.
In the case of common sense and programming language areas, the relation means and 
ends is the operational core of the necessary means of an action. And this action is the fulfill-
ment of an end proposed in a specific and well-determined problem. The agent, whether arti-
ficial or human, ratiocinates and performs an action, which configures a practical reasoning.
The operational core assumes the relation through the fixation of an end and verifies the 
means to its fulfillment. This core, oriented by the relation means and ends, fills the gaps 
between the precedent and the consequent, not allowing any external determination on the 
proposition of the reasoning. The operational character of the reasoning execution by an 
agent endorses the adjective instrumental. We can see a possible definition for this sort of 
reasoning in John Broome’s perspective:
Your reasoning process is a particular type of practical resoning. It is instrumental 
reasoning, which means it is concerned with taking an appropriate means to end. 
[...]. There are other sorts of practical reasoning too, but if we want to understand 
practical reasoning, it is a good idea start with instrumental reasoning, because it is 
less controversial than other sorts. (Broome, 2002, p.86).
The point we underline, on its instrumental sense, is that the practical reasoning has the 
scope of internal elements subsumed by “taking an appropriate means to end”. This submis-
sion demonstrates the unity between the common sense and programming areas. To clarify 
this, we need to make an observation on the scope of reasoning in general, reviewing what 
we have said about the first group of ethics.
In the first group, the field of ethics is unilaterally assumed, and the scope is different. 
The example (1) has on proposition (1.a) the announcement of a moral maxim, and it deter-
mines the scope, the expression of this maxim is beyond reasoning. In example (2), the 
passage from the precedent to the consequent evidences a gap. Moreover, this gap suffers 
the ethical determination which, on its external and implicit form, detaches itself allowing 
such inferential passage and the arrival of the reasoning conclusion.
In the practical reasoning from common sense and programming languages, the scope 
is reduced to the proposed end. The reducer character of the scope is a shared characteristic 
of both areas. But, we can notice a difference in the details of the argumentation process. It 
will be explained hereafter through examples.
The first example, in the area of common sense, is a modified version used by many 
authors, as follows:
(3.a) It is raining.
(3.b) I want to go to the train station two blocks from my house.
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(3.c) I take an umbrella (description of an action) or
(3.d) I want to take an umbrella (I have the intention).
The example shows that the conclusion in (3.c) or (3.d) expresses a mean to reaching an 
end. This conclusion can be an action (3.c) or an intention (3.d). Both possibilities of conclu-
sion are determined by the end in (3.b). And the reasoning has its scope closed according to 
such end. The action, or intention of an action, presented in conclusion (3.c) or (3.d) shows 
the achievement or direction of a mean. It differs from ethics, since there is no specific deter-
mination, arising from an ethical reflection, internal or external to the practical reasoning.
The absence of an underlying ethical reflection is shown in (3.b). The proposition of 
(3.b) reveals only a will or intention. However, it is possible to object that there is a reason 
not explicit to the conclusion and, therefore, to the inferential passage that begins from 
(3.a) and (3.b) and goes to (3.c) or (3.d). This “reason not explicit” would be something 
like “An umbrella serves to protect us from the rain”. The “reason not explicit” belongs to 
the set of true beliefs of the agent. And, in this case, the set of beliefs has, as a background, 
an epistemological reflection, not an ethical one. However, it is a discussion which will not 
take place here.
The formalization of the example is:
(p ^ q)  r
-where p = (3.a); q = (3.b) and r = (3.c or 3.d as either action or intention).
The propositions “p” and “q” (“it is raining” and “I want to go to the train station two 
blocks from my house”) must be true so that the conclusion is also true, and the process, 
as a whole, logically true. Including in this case, similarly to the previous examples, the 
logical validity is detached from the practical reasoning, for even if the propositions “p” and 
“q” are false (therefore, if every precedent is false) and the conclusion true, the reasoning 
would be true and valid. Once again we are considering only the conditionality and not a 
material implication. One example of this situation would be: “- if… is false that is raining 
and it is false that I want to go to the station two blocks from my house…, then… I take 
an umbrella…” Pragmatically this is irrational, but logically true. The opponent against this 
practical reasoning mode, which has the burden of proof, would have to show that it is not 
pragmatically irrational to take an umbrella under the circumstance in which I don’t want 
to go to the station and it is not raining.
In the common sense area we can say that the practical reasoning fastens itself in a 
specific point. The agent defines the end and pursuits the required mean to reach it. The 
definition of an end approaches him/her to the practical egoism and a self-concern calcu-
lation, where the resource of probability can be used to analyze the means that lead to the 
fulfillment of the end.
There is an opening to ethics in this egoism12, but this opening is not originating, but 
derived from the instrumental condition. Yet, regarding the instrumental plan of practical 
reasoning, the ethical egoism enlarges the scope beyond the premises of the reasoning. 
12 The exposure of different approaches of “ethical egoism”, under a neo-hobbesean influence, can be found on 
David Gauthier’s book: Gauthier, D. Morals by agreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986, p.157-189. 
Differently, but still under a neo-hobbesean matrix, there is: Baier, Kurt. The Rational and the Moral Order: 
The Social Roots of Reason and Morality. Chicago: Open Court, 1995, p.159-173.
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That is, it goes further the restrained concern of the reasoning and orients itself by another 
underlying wider concern (derived from an ethical tendency). The operational and instru-
mental character of the practical reasoning, on the other hand, reduces the reach, focusing 
the conclusion on the most suitable mean, without any other influent determination, as the 
ethical reflection. It shows, once more, that the characteristic of ethics is to work with a 
different scope from the relation means and ends expressed on instrumental reasoning.
The decision of the agent on behalf of one mean to another depends on a background that 
thematizes the problem to be solved. This factor has the prior characteristic of intelligibility, 
which is thematized in a philosophical way, because it is a furtive element and, on its furtive 
quality, it acquires a possible treatment, but not necessarily in the ethical reflection. It is, 
ultimately, dealing with the existence of a background13. From this background the agent is 
able to decide his action. The agent deals with the available and exact means, generally used 
to deliberate or access the most suitable means to each end. Thus, occupied by immediate 
problems, the common sense has a reduced scope.
The other example of this group is the one inferred on programming languages. The 
relation means and ends remains, in this case, as main element of the operational core of 
the reasoning. The difference is that, in the common sense, the end (to be reached) is in 
the thread of premises and, therefore, dominates the whole scope of the reasoning. Never-
theless, regarding the programming languages, the scope of the reasoning refers to beyond 
an immediate, limited situation. This means that the resolution of a problem occurs by the 
acceptance of an unpredicted problem, and its ulterior division in several other problems, 
configuring the biggest and the smallest. The consequence is that the end loses its reducer 
fixed form and the process becomes more complex with such division.
The programming languages which work on practical reasoning are the ones connected 
to developments of Artificial Intelligence. These languages from A.I. deal with unexpected 
problems until certain level. The fragmentation of an unexpected problem in many other 
smaller problems implies the respective division of the pursuit end in smaller ones, creating 
new specific stages of execution. Each stage constitutes a new end and a new problem, 
however smaller14. From an external perspective, the general processing depends on the 
resolution of the end originally proposed (the one which was divided). The program starts 
such division and searches for alternatives face the unexpected.
This is an example of practical reasoning on its use by the programming languages15:
13 The action of an agent in the Artificial Intelligence is given in a furtive form according to the software 
architecture in which this agent is built. The main architectures are: reactive, deliberative and hybrid. Cf. 
Wooldbridge e Jennings, 1995, p.130, 132 e 134. 
14 Cf.: Nilsson, J. Nils. Problem-Solving Methods in Artificial Intelligence. McGraw-Hill, 1971: “A somewhat 
more sophisticated problem-solving approach involves the notion of subproblems. In the approach, an analysis 
is made of the original problem in order to produce a set of subproblems such that solutions to some particular 
subset of the subproblems such that solutions to some particular subset of the subproblems would imply a 
solution to the original problem.” (p.5).
15 This example was inspired by Steels, L. “Cooperation between distributed agents through self organization”. In: 
Demazeau, Y.; Müller, J. P. (eds.). Decentralized AI: Proceeding of The First European Workshop on Modelling 
Autonomous Agents in Multi-Agent World. Amsterdam, 1990, p.175. In the original example of Steels, there are 
agents, in independent vehicles and different points, exploring a distant planet without a detailed map. They 
must move, communicate and overcome obstacles. 
19The Ethics and the Practical Reasoning: About Common Sense and Programming
Daimon. Revista Internacional de Filosofía, nº 76 (Enero-Abril) 2019
(4.a) the robot X-1 is an independent agent and must travel through a narrow path in 
Mars until point 10-10, where there is a clearing where it can collect samples. This robot 
has a mapping based on simple Cartesian axis.
(4.b) the robot X-1 is performing the action described above, when in point 8-8, it visua-
lizes a landslide on its narrow path, blocking its progress.
(4.c) the point 8-8 has only one bifurcation on the right, which is still unexplored by 
robot X-1 and, it doesn’t have data about this area.
(4.d) the robot X-1 must decide whether to travel through the bifurcation or return to 
base.
(4.e) the robot consults its own data bank, but there is nothing programmed on this 
respect, except by the order to start a research process with other agents involved in the 
exploration of this planet (or other robots, satellites or other sensors). This robot has a 
communication platform with the other agents, such platform is developed in a determined 
programming architecture. The classification of these architectures originally present three 
possibilities: deliberative, reactive or hybrid. In this case, our robot cannot have a reactive 
programming architecture because all its research and decisions would be previously pro-
grammed and it wouldn’t deal with unexpected situations. Furthermore, a reactive program-
ming would demand spend of time in communications with Earth.
And (4.f), the robot X-1 has the following options based on incomplete data about the 
unknown path on the right: it can either (4.1.f) travel through the bifurcation path on the 
right. In this case, the data regarding the landslide, obtained from other artificial agents, 
wouldn’t indicate any major threat in the decision to go by an unknown path, in addition, 
the robot would use its sensors to travel through such path; or (4.2.f) the robot wouldn’t 
accomplish its aim of reaching point 10-10 and would return to base. In this case, the data 
obtained, although they contain new information which need to be processed by X-1, reach a 
dangerousness-level that is not tolerable in the security protocol, consequently, the proposed 
end on point 10-10 is not achieved.
Let’s analyze in details the argumentative structure of the practical reasoning:
- First part: from 4.a to 4.d;
- Conclusion of first part: 4.d;
- Second part: from 4.e to 4.f;
- Conclusion of second part: 4.f;
- The consultation with other agents start in 4.e and it represents the access to a new 
set of data, in the form of new propositions about the initial problem, generating the 
division of this problem in several parts; the new set of data consists of information 
passed by other agents. The small problems, which come along the information from 
other agents, must contribute as hallmarks of dangerousness-level regarding the deci-
sion of following or not the unknown path. The information is passed and translated 
in new premises, which must have conclusions that make robot X-1 progress or not. 
Besides, the new information help evaluate the danger of the path. The decision to go 
on or not depends on the comparison between the as beacons of dangerousness-level 
and the importance of achieving the end. It is important in example (4) the potentially 
deferrable end and the beginning of a consultation with other agents. Each new stage 
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on the bifurcation path, if it is the path chosen by the robot, is a small problem to be 
solved, because the ambit of the incursion became unknown.
In the programming languages, there is no determination of an ethical proposition, 
whether it is internal or external. And there isn’t a relation reduced to a circumstance 
which configures the whole problem either. It means that the scope of the major problem 
is restricted, because the end, put on the major problem, can be postponed and divided in 
smaller problems with smaller ends. Furthermore, it is still possible to exist a platform of 
multi-agents that helps the resolution of an unexpected problem through consultation and 
gathering of new data.
The decision process of robot X-1 also requires the information acquired on the exchange 
of data with other agents. The connection of robot X-1 to the other agents can be illustrated 
by the theory of games16. The work and survival process of the agents is cooperative and 
the relation between them tends to a balance and a strategic positioning17. The multi-agents 
platform performs the task of exchanging information to meet the requirements of an action 
to be executed. We can also understand the relation of robot X-1 with the other agents as a 
egoist relation. The theory of games contemplates such possibility, where each player con-
tributes with the other, but not giving up from their own specific aims.
The examples (3) and (4), presented on this section, show sorts of practical reasoning 
that highlight the emphasis in the relation means and ends, and which have the action or a 
orientation to the action, as a result of the respective conclusions. As we presented earlier, 
this sort of reasoning can be called “instrumental practical reasoning” and it doesn’t suffer 
external determinations which influence its inferential processes (as in ethics). This being 
said, we can present our conclusion.
Conclusion
The practical reasoning in general, cannot be considered as exclusively moral and subject 
to an ethical orientation. However, if it is so considered, the ethics will exercise a certain 
sidedness on the theme, depriving and dispelling other areas, where reasoning also pursuits 
an action. Considering every practical reasoning as moral-practical reasoning, or ethical 
reasoning, this is a mode to suppress the way to different sorts of reasoning that are present 
in our actual world.
The other forms of reasoning as the common sense and the programming languages 
don’t have an ethical oriented reflection. Nonetheless, these areas develop reasoning that 
16 Cf.: Nilsson, J. Nils. Problem-Solving Methods in Artificial Intelligence. McGraw-Hill, 1971, p.109-111.
17 One of the ways of explaining this balance is according to the theory of games, which is basically a mathematical 
approach. As orientation, we use in our example, an influence of Equilibrium from John Nash, where there is 
cooperation between participants of a game. In the history of the theory of games, Nash’s proposal differs from 
the initial proposal of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (Cf.: Von Neumann, J.; Morgenstern, O. The Theory of 
Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004, Sixtieth-Anniversary Edition, 
2004, p.31-43). It is important to consider the applied sophistication posterior to Nash’s theory with the concept 
of “risk-dominance”. (Cf.: Harsaniy, J. C.; Selten, R. A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games. 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988, p.87).
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result in actions or intentions. We wanted, with this article, to show the importance in distin-
guishing, from ethics, the other areas regarding the practical reasoning issue. Furthermore, 
having this intention in mind, we wanted to open the way to a plurality in the discussion 
of the practical reasoning issue and the insertion of new debates, which become pressing, 
especially in the area of programming languages. This article presented, through examples, 
the differences mentioned above, configuring a new start to rich future discussions on the 
practical reasoning issue.
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